reconciling textual language with arguably contradictory legislative history; and (2) assessing whether Congress intends to alter a general presumption in the law with specific statutory directives when the statute is silent as to the general presumption. This Article is organized into four Parts, with each devoted to a particular subject or issue that courts have addressed in CAFA's first full year: (A) statutory applicability questions; (B) the imposition of sanctions in CAFA removal practice; (C) burden of proof issues; and (D) finally, a discussion of several substantive issues that have arisen under the new legislation.
A. Statutory Applicability Questions
One of the primary issues the courts have addressed in CAFA's first year has been determining to what cases it applies. Section 9 of CAFA provides, "[tihe amendments made by this Act shall apply to any civil action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act.", 2 The problem is that Congress did not define what it meant by "commenced."
There are a number of possibilities, of course, as to what Congress intended by using this term. "Commenced" could refer to the date that the action was filed in state court, or some other date which, under state law, marks a suit's commencement. Alternatively, Congress could have meant to refer to some other date that application of federal law would identify.
For instance, Congress might have intended to say that a suit is "commenced" when it is removed from state court into federal court. This reading has some support in CAFA's policy purposes because the legislation was passed to expand the scope of federal jurisdiction over class action suits. 3 Still, other readings are possible.
2. Class Action Fairness Act § 9. 3. See Class Action Fairness Act § 2(b) ("The purpose[] of this Act [is to provide] .. .for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction . . . "). On the other hand, that Congress sought to expand federal jurisdiction does not resolve the question of the extent to which it has done so. See Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 404 F.3d 1232 , 1237 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005 ("[The court is] mindful of the fact that Congress' goal in passing this legislation was to increase access to federal courts... [b] ut these general sentiments do not provide carte blanche for federal jurisdiction over a state class action any time the statute is ambiguous."), reprinted as amended, 420 F.3d 1090 420 F.3d (10th Cir. 2005 .
Although the term is undefined, and there may be some policy reasons for reading "commenced" as based on some date other than the date that state law marks the start of a new suit in state court, generally speaking, when Congress has used "commenced" in the past as a method of marking a new act's reach, it usually expected federal courts to look to state law to determine the start date. 4 This Part focuses on how courts have interpreted CAFA's use of the word "commenced.", 5 Lower courts have roundly and unanimously rejected the argument that an action is "commenced," within § 9's meaning, on the date that it is removed to federal court. The first court to reject the argument was the district court in Colorado, whose decision was subsequently affirmed by Tenth Circuit in Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc. 6 Following Pritchett, the First, 7. Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 424 F.3d 43, 44 (1st Cir. 2005) . 8. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lott, 417 F.3d 725, 726 (7th Cir. 2005) ; Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 806 (7th Cir. 2005). 9. Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) . also rejected it. 10 Price v. Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, Inc. '' is probably one of the strangest post-CAFA commencement cases. In Price, plaintiffs initially filed an action in state court which the defendants promptly removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 12 After the court ordered a remand, the plaintiffs apparently had a change of heart and decided they wanted to litigate in the federal forum. 13 To that end, they dismissed their previous suit and re-filed a new suit in federal court, citing CAFA as the source of the court's original jurisdiction (plaintiffs filed the suit after CAFA had gone into effect).
14 Defendants-who also had a change of heart-now decided they preferred a state forum and argued that the action against them was commenced when the first state suit was filed; citing the Tenth Circuit's decision in Pritchett, they argued that CAFA did not therefore apply to the newly filed action.'
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The district court distinguished Pritchett, observing that plaintiffs' re-filing must be treated as a new case. 16 It was also significant to the court that it lacked jurisdiction over the initial state action that had been removed. 1 7 The court did not indicate why the absence of jurisdiction in the first case had any bearing on when the second action was commenced for purposes of CAFA. Its relevance probably related to the defendants' argument that it would be "unfair" to preclude a defendant from removing a case that was commenced before the effective date of CAFA but allow a plaintiff to dismiss a pending case and re-file it so as to take advantage of the statute's jurisdictional provision.' 8 Although the plaintiffs were clearly forum shopping when they dismissed their state case and refiled a second case in federal court, they were legally entitled to do so, 19 just as the defendants were legally entitled to remove the originally filed state case.
A second version of the commencement issue is whether a case commences at the filing of the lawsuit or the serving of the defendant.
Defendants have argued that a state case is "commenced," within the meaning of section 9 of CAFA, on the date of service. A number of defendants have succeeded in this 20 argument.
In the only reported appellate court decision on this issue, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument, finding that the case was commenced when it was filed. 2 '
Where a state law treats the date of service as relevant to the date the action is commenced, it is important to consider why the state law treats the service date as significant. 22. An example would be a rule that treats as time-barred a suit filed just before the statute of limitations has run when the plaintiff waits too long to serve process. See, e.g., Multer v. Multer, 280 Ala. 458, 463 (1966) (denying relief due to unconscionable delay under the equitable doctrine of laches, although the action was filed within the statutory three-year period).
state uses the date of service simply as the date on which the action has commenced for most purposes, 2 3 then the date of service is the relevant date for purposes of section 9. The courts that keep these differences straight are more likely to attend to the purposes Congress had in mind when it enacted CAFA. Problems arise when the courts fail to distinguish these different kinds of date of service 24 provisions.
The final commencement issue before courts concerns amendments, which is to say situations in which a complaint was filed prior to February 18, 2005 and amended Knudsen, that a defendant joined after CAFA's enactment commenced a new suit. See id. at *4 ("Plaintiffs' decision to add Rogers Group as a defendant presents precisely the situation in which it can and should be said that a new action has 'commenced' for purposes of removal pursuant to the CAFA.").
Since Knudsen, the courts have been inconsistent in their use of relation back law. 28 A few courts that have found that reliance on the relation-back doctrine is misplaced; however several have lost precedential value due to subsequent higher court decisions. 2 9 After Pritchett, courts have readily rejected the argument that would have given the broadest effect to when a suit is "commenced" under CAFA (that is, a case is "commenced" when it is removed). Similarly, after Knudsen, courts have also rejected the slight variation on the argument that a suit is "commenced" when the plaintiffs broaden the class definition, though, as we have seen, Knudsen's legacy in referencing relation-back law has been significant. Not all courts have found post-CAFA amendments to constitute the commencement of a new suit for CAFA purposes, but nearly all have followed Knudsen in turning to relation-back law to analyze the problem.
28. The following cases applied the relation-back doctrine to hold that an amended complaint did not commence a new action for the purposes of CAFA: By contrast, the following cases applied the relation-back doctrine to hold that an amended complaint did commence a new action for the purposes of CAFA: Plummer, 388 F. : Pfizer, Inc. v. Lott, and Natale v. Pfizer, Inc. 3 In both cases, the trial court rejected the defendants' argument and, after virtually simultaneous appeal, the respective appellate courts did the same. The timing of these cases may have caused particular frustration for the defendant, Pfizer. Both cases were filed shortly before CAFA was passed. In particular, Pfizer, Inc. v Contrast this to the argument made in Lott and Natale for allowing removal of a suit previously pending before the date the statute went into effect. 47 The problem with the argument is that § 1446(b) is not a grant of original jurisdiction to the district courts. It got worse-much worse-for Hewlett-Packard. Not only did the court reject Hewlett-Packard's attempt to treat the amendment as a new action for CAFA purposes, but it also signaled to the plaintiff and the district court that an award of attorneys fees for improper removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) may be warranted. 58 No doubt the panel was motivated, following its decisions in Knudsen and Lott, to send the message that defense lawyers had better think twice before removing another case under CAFA filed prior to February 18, 2005.59 Other courts, more willing to treat attempts to come within CAFA as based in good faith, have rejected arguments that sanctions should be imposed under § 1447(c). 6° In Schorsch, Judge Easterbrook also readdressed the choice-of-law issue. 61 As discussed previously, Knudsen mentioned the possible relevance of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) to a case where a plaintiff did attempt to bring another claim or name a new party. 62 Thus, Knudsen left the impression that resort to the federal relation-back rule was proper to determine when a state action that has been amended is "commenced" for purposes of CAFA, even though the statute is In Schorsch, Judge Easterbrook observed, without explanation, that although Knudsen had referenced Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) as bearing relevance on the date of commencement question, "state rather than federal practice must supply the rule of decision" for determining when an action is commenced for purposes of deciding whether CAFA applies to the state action after amendment.
64 He continued to insist, though, that relation-back rules bore relevance for deciding the scope of CAFA's applicability under section 9.65 Apparently undaunted by the Schorsch court's recommendation to the district court to consider sanctioning Hewlett-Packard for its improper removal in Schorsch, the defendants in Schillinger v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 66 argued that CAFA applied to a state case filed 67 prior to February 18, 2005. In Schillinger, the Seventh Circuit again rejected the attempt to expand the statute's reach. 68 The Schillingers sued Union Pacific Railroad Corporation (UPC) and Union Pacific Railroad Company (UPRR) alleging that the two companies illegally leased plaintiffs land to a third party. 69 An initial attempt at removing the case on traditional diversity grounds was unsuccessful because the amount in controversy was found insufficient.
70
After remand, the plaintiffs dismissed UPC after they realized that this entity did not own any right of way.V7 They thereafter sought to amend their complaint, seeking certification of a nationwide class. 72 The amended complaint also inadvertently included UPC as a defendant in the case's caption and in a number of the allegations, even though they had dismissed UPC and had made no attempt at service on UPC. Although the state case predated CAFA, the defendants argued that the two post-statute developments-the request for certification of a nationwide class and the (albeit mistaken) re-joinder of UPC "changed the case so profoundly" that it now was removable. 74 The district court again ordered remand, and defendants sought leave to appeal to the Seventh Circuit. 75 For the fourth time in as many tries, a defendant's attempt to get the Seventh Circuit to find CAFA applicable to a state case filed before the CAFA's enactment was unsuccessful. 76 The court quickly dispatched the defendants' first argument. Because UPC was rejoined in the case and, thus, a new action was commenced against it after February 18, 2005, the district court found that "UPC was never really brought back into the case," concluding that it was merely "a scrivener's error" on plaintiffs' part that could be corrected by subsequent amendment.
77
The defendants' second basis for removal was that when the plaintiffs went from seeking only a statewide class to certification of a nationwide class, that amendment was a "step sufficiently distinct that courts would treat it as independent for limitations purposes," borrowing language from Knudsen.
78
Writing for the panel in Schorsch, Judge Wood recognized that the expanded class would have been far more onerous to defend against, but, following Knudsen and Schorsch, concluded that "the potential for a larger amount of legal research and discovery in and of itself is not a significant enough step to create new litigation. , 79 Judge Wood then discussed a second possible reason for rejecting defendants' argument, though she did not base the decision on this ground. 80 She noted that for purposes of deciding whether an amended complaint meets the statute of limitations deadline, Illinois courts consider the date the motion to amend is filed, and not the date that the motion is granted. 81 If the Illinois rule were the governing rule, then it would have been dispositive in Schillinger because the motion to expand the proposed class was filed before CAFA's enactment but had not yet been ruled upon when the new statute went into effect.
8 2 Having already concluded that the nature of the amendment sought was not significant enough to treat the amended suit as the commencement of a new lawsuit for CAFA purposes, the court decided not to reach whether state law governed, or whether the outcome would be different under the federal rules of procedure.
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C. Appellate Piggybacking and the Shifting Sands of Burden of Proof
The last major circuit court decision handed down as of this writing to construe CAFA was Brill v. Countrywide, 4 a case in which the defendant removed a state suit both on the basis of CAFA and on the basis of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). 8 5 The district court remanded the case, finding that the amount in controversy was inadequate under CAFA and that TCPA conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the state court.
86
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis in Brill by addressing the question of who bears the burden of proving the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.
87 Defendant conceded the long standing general rule that the party seeking to maintain federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proof, but argued that the burden of demonstrating lack of federal jurisdiction is on the plaintiff in a CAFA case.88
At the time the defendant in Brill advanced this argument, the lower courts were split on whether CAFA shifts the burden of proof to the party seeking remand. Some had held-and several more have since held-that CAFA shifts the burden of proving the nonexistence of subject matter jurisdiction to the plaintiffs. 8 9 Others have refused to find CAFA alters the traditional burden of demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction. 90 The argument that CAFA does shift the burden of proof cannot be made on the basis of the text alone: it is a rather inconvenient fact for burden-shifters that CAFA is silent about who bears the burden of proving or disproving the existence of jurisdiction under CAFA. The argument for the shift in the traditional burden of proof is instead usually made on the basis of a portion of CAFA's legislative history, namely part of one Senate Judiciary Committee report that provides: "If a purported class action is removed pursuant to these jurisdictional provisions, the named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating that the removal was improvident (i.e., that the applicable jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied)." 9 1 This was, of course, exactly the language the defendant in Brill referenced. 92 Reliance on the statute's legislative history certainly seems misplaced. To begin with, it is not at all clear that reference to the legislative history is warranted in the first instance. As one district court sagely observed: "[tihe omission of a burden of proof standard in the CAFA does not create an ambiguity inviting courts to scour its legislative history to decide the point." 93 Moreover, although none of the courts have made reference to it, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services 94 and its treatment of the value of legislative history in the context of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, certainly should give pause to purveyors of the CAFA burden-shifting argument.
95
The better argument would seem to be that, [b]y failing to specifically address the burden of proof in the Act, especially in light of discussing the issue in a Committee Report, Congress is deemed to have not intended to change the settled case law on that issue. Had Congress wished to change which party bears the burden of proof in a removal action under the CAFA it could have explicitly done so.
96
In Brill, the Seventh Circuit was unimpressed with the defendant's citation to CAFA's legislative history. 97 It reaffirmed that the burden of demonstrating the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction in a CAFA removal rests with the party seeking the federal forum. 98 Nothing in CAFA expressly alters the traditional placement of the burden, Easterbrook noted, and the views of some congressmen (that are nowhere reflected in the engrossed bill), are not controlling. 99 93. Ongstad v. Piper Jaffray & Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1085 , 1089 (D.N.D. 2006 ). 94. 125 S. Ct. 2611 .
95.
Id. at 2625-26. In Exxon, the Supreme Court found that resort to legislative history was inappropriate when the statute itself is unambiguous. Id. at 2626. Like the supplemental jurisdiction statute at issue in Exxon, CAFA is unambiguous: There is no provision on burden of proof, and, under Exxon, a Senate Report cannot imply such a provision into the act. Congress is presumed to be aware of existing law when it passes legislation. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 700-01 (1992) . As such, the preexisting rule, of which Congress was aware, should remain in effect until Congress explicitly changes it. See id. at 701. 96. Ongstad, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1089 . 97. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005 .
98. Id.
Id.
The last interesting procedural issue that arose in Brill concerned the right to an interlocutory appeal. 1 0 0 As we have seen, CAFA contains a provision, § 1453(c), that allows a party to seek leave to appeal a remand order, a privilege usually unavailable as a consequence of the remand review bar in § 1447(d). 1 0 On the basis of § 1453(c), the defendant successfully petitioned for appellate review of the district court's remand order. 1 0 2 What was different about Brill was that the defendant argued that a separate federal statute provided another basis for original federal question jurisdiction, beyond CAFA. 10 3 The Seventh Circuit found that it could review the remand order as to the separate federal statute, even though § 1447(d) would otherwise preclude appellate review of the remand order had the case been removed solely under the other federal statute and not also under CAFA.
1 0 4 "Because § 1453(c)(1) permits appellate review of remand orders 'notwithstanding section 1447(d),"' the court in Brill concluded, "we are free to consider any potential error in the district court's decision, not just a mistake in application of the Class Action Fairness Act."' 1 0 5
D. Substantive Interpretations of CAFA
As we have seen, most of the cases addressing CAFA in its first year have dealt with procedural issues, primarily, to what cases does CAFA apply? A few courts have begun to address some substantive questions under CAFA, however, and they merit brief discussion.
The substantive issue in Brill turned on whether the amount in controversy in the case exceeded $5 million because, under CAFA, the district court would have then had jurisdiction. 1 6 The defendant easily met its burden, the Seventh Circuit found, because the defendant conceded that it had done enough of the things about 100. Id. at451 52. 101. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2006) ("[N]otwithstanding section 1447(d), a court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the State court from which it was removed if application is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of the order.").
102. which plaintiff complained (distributing fax advertisements); thus, it was simply a math equation at this point to determine whether the minimum amount in controversy had been reached. 1 0 7 Plaintiffs might have avoided federal court if they had alleged they would not seek more than $5 million, but they had not done so.'
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One district court has also addressed the issue of quantifying the amount in controversy for CAFA purposes. In Eufaula, after finding that the case was commenced after CAFA was enacted, the court was still apparently unsure of who bore the burden of proving the existence of jurisdiction and ordered the parties to file further briefing addressing the issue°109 The court failed to cite either Brill or any of the cases discussed above that have also addressed the question. Then, without waiting to decide who must carry the burden, the court required both sides to provide "specific evidence" to support their assertion that the amount in controversy was or was not met. ' 10 It is not entirely clear what specific evidence the court required at this stage of the case to evaluate whether the amount in the controversy exceeded CAFA's jurisdictional minimum of $5 million. Plaintiffs in Eufaula sought certification of a nationwide class that it hoped to define as "all pharmacies and/or other similar entities who entered into a contract which provided for reimbursement of prescriptions" with defendant over the last six years, according to a formula that used the average wholesale price of the drug. 111 Seeking to avoid removal to federal court on the basis of § 1332, the plaintiffs also specifically limited their recovery to no more than $74,500 per plaintiff."12 A plaintiffs willingness to limit the amount of damages sought is typically recognized. 13 claims are aggregated post-CAFA, it is also now necessary to make a showing as to how many putative members of the class there would likely be. 114 Still, the basic obligation is likely to remain the same: the party who seeks to establish federal jurisdiction must show by "a reasonable probability that the stakes exceed the minimum," ' 11 5 provided that the allegations are made in good faith. When she subsequently sought an injunction against the defendant to prevent it from merging with another company, as well as imposition of a constructive trust, the defendant argued that the relief sought by plaintiff in the suit, which was identical to relief sought in six similar patient care cases, would impact all similarly situated plaintiffs and, thus, should be treated as though it were a class action.
120
The district court rejected the attempt to turn the plaintiffs single claims into representative litigation under Rule 23 or a state equivalent. 121 Citing the new § 1332(d), the court ruled that CAFA did not apply to plaintiffs claims because it covered only "any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action." ' 122 Adams v. Federal Materials Co. 123 is also worth briefly mentioning. In Adams, the plaintiffs tried to argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B)'s mandatory remand provision applied. 124 This CAFA subsection requires the court to decline jurisdiction where "twothirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed."'1 25 The plaintiffs' argument was that one defendant, who had been originally joined as a thirdparty defendant, should not have its citizenship counted for purposes of applying this subsection. 126 The court refused to go along with this argument, however, where the plaintiffs subsequently amended the complaint to assert claims directly against this defendant.
127
E. Conclusion
Beyond these few cases addressing substantive issues under CAFA, most CAFA case law handed down in the statute's first year has addressed only procedural issues relevant under the act: what is the relevance and import of CAFA's legislative history, particularly when the statutory text is otherwise silent or neutral; whether CAFA can ever be applied to cases pending before CAFA's effective date; and whether CAFA shifts the burden of proof on demonstrating the existence of federal jurisdiction. Further discussion of CAFA's substantive content awaits.
In closing, it is perhaps worthwhile to suggest one other virtue to having undertaken this retrospective review. Studying the decisions that have come down after CAFA's enactment offers an opportunity 
127.
Id; see also supra Part III.B.2.a.i (discussing various potential definitions for CAFA's phrase, "primary defendants").
to vividly witness the kind of strategic decision-making and gamesmanship that routinely takes place after a change in the law by those most centrally involved in dealing with it; that is, lawyers representing clients in cases to which the law may or may not be applicable. Observing and exposing these strategic maneuverings in the immediate aftermath of a new law's enactment-particularly one as significant as CAFA's-offers an important reminder that forum shopping in civil litigation is, and probably always will be, a twoway street.
